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A Historical Basis for
Force Requirements in
Counterinsurgency
STEVEN M. GOODE

O

ver the last eight years, one question has repeatedly come up in regard
to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan: How many soldiers are enough?
The question was first raised before the Iraq war started, with highly publicized disagreements between senior military leaders regarding the number of forces needed to secure Iraq after the invasion. The debate reached
another peak when the “surge” strategy was announced. It has once again
become the subject of national discussion, this time with respect to Afghanistan. Despite years of debate, our understanding of force requirements for
counterinsurgency has advanced little since 1995, when James Quinlivan of
RAND published a seminal article on the subject.1
The current article describes work done by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) to better inform the discussion by examining historical data related to counterinsurgencies. The intent is not to make any policy recommendations. Nor should this analysis be interpreted to suggest that force levels
alone are the key to victory in counterinsurgency. Having enough military
forces is a necessary, but by no means sufficient, condition for success. The
twentieth century is replete with examples of counterinsurgents winning Pyrrhic military victories that resulted in political losses. The French in Algeria
and the Portuguese in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau prevailed militarily
but ultimately acceded to the insurgents’ demands for independence. The
British devoted enormous forces to Cyprus and suffered relatively few losses
but nonetheless had to give up control of most of the island.
That said, however, force levels do matter, and history can provide
a guideline for force requirements in counterinsurgency. The analysis described in this article shows that there are three major drivers of military requirements. First, as previous studies have argued and current doctrine emphasizes, security forces have to be sized relative to the population. Second,
the more intense the insurgency, the more forces are required to reverse
Winter 2009-10

45

increasing insurgent violence. Third, the larger the percentage of personnel
that are drawn from the host nation, the fewer forces will be needed overall.
Before detailing the exact relationships between these factors and force requirements, or discussing their implications for US policy, it is appropriate
to briefly review the current state of the debate.
Past Efforts
Current doctrine as contained in an Army and Marine Corps field
manual says the following about force levels in counterinsurgency:
. . . [N]o predetermined, fixed ratio of friendly troops to enemy combatants ensures success in [counterinsurgency] . . . . A better force
requirement gauge is troop density, the ratio of security forces (including the host nation’s military and police forces as well as foreign
counterinsurgents) to inhabitants. Most density recommendations fall
within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1,000 residents
in an [area of operations]. Twenty counterinsurgents per 1,000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective [counterinsurgency] operations; however, as with any fixed
ratio, such calculations remain very dependent on the situation.2

These ratios appear to be based on Quinlivan’s work. He emphasized, though
did not originate, the idea of sizing security forces to the population rather
than the enemy. Further, the recommendation of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents
per 1,000 residents appears to be based at least in part on his observations
that British forces in Northern Ireland and Malaya peaked at about 20 per
1,000 residents, and that international forces in Bosnia and Kosovo reached
levels between 20 and 25 per 1,000.3 As Quinlivan noted, however, those
cases represent only part of the scale. History also includes cases such as
the postwar occupation of Germany, where successful stability operations
were mounted with only 2.2 security forces per 1,000 residents. In contrast,
the counterinsurgents under French command in Algeria peaked at nearly
60 per 1,000 residents, and the Russians committed more than 150 soldiers
per 1,000 residents in Chechnya in 2003.
The other major study on this topic was by John McGrath.4 McGrath’s
major contribution was the observation that counterinsurgent forces need to
dedicate a portion of their personnel to police duties. Based on his calcu-
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lations of police-to-population ratios in several major American cities, McGrath suggested a figure of 4.1 soldiers per 1,000 residents should be devoted
to police duties. This figure may not be precisely appropriate for all nations,
but McGrath’s insight is valuable because it underscores the need to include
police functions in any discussion of security force requirements.
Data and Definitions
Past efforts on this subject have been hampered by the relative lack of
data. What information was available on past counterinsurgencies has been
scattered across a number of sources. The CAA identified three problems
caused by this lack of data. First, it has limited the number of case studies
available for examination. Quinlivan and McGrath together looked at only
15 cases. This contrasts with the dozens of insurgencies, peacekeeping operations, contingency operations, and the like that have taken place since
1945. The second problem is that while not all conflicts are equally intense,
there has been no agreed-upon measure of intensity. If, as this article will
show, more intense insurgencies require larger counterinsurgent forces to
defeat them, then the intensity of the insurgency becomes a key driver of
force requirements. Third, the lack of data has prevented any significant
analysis of the relationship between force levels and intensity over time. It
can be misleading to use peak military numbers, as force levels often continue to rise for a time after an insurgency is largely defeated. In order to
remedy this lack of data, CAA built an Irregular Warfare Database containing year-by-year data on more than 100 conflicts. The analysis described in
this article was built on that database.
The analysis of irregular warfare has also been bedeviled by a profusion of terms of overlapping scope. Quinlivan examined “stability operations,” while McGrath studied “contingency operations.” Each term covers
a wide range of conflicts and operations. Of the 15 cases studied by the two
authors, three (Germany, Austria, and Japan) were peaceful post-war occupations of defeated powers. Six (the Philippines, Malaya, Northern Ireland,
the Punjab, Iraq, and Afghanistan) can be described as counterinsurgencies. Six (the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia, and
Kosovo) were stabilization, humanitarian, or peacekeeping operations. The
problem with grouping such disparate situations is that the force requirements for different kinds of operations may be very different. The occupation of Germany after World War II could be conducted with a relatively
low force-to-population ratio because the Germans had been soundly defeated and offered essentially no resistance to the occupying forces. Simi-
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larly, in many peacekeeping operations, the peacekeepers are present with
the consent of the local population and face relatively little armed opposition. In contrast, the insurgencies in the Philippines and Malaya required
considerably larger forces.
Scope and Methodology
CAA’s analysis was motivated by a desire to put force levels in the
current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan into historical context. Accordingly,
the scope was limited to counterinsurgencies, as defined in joint doctrine:
Insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.
Counterinsurgency: Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.5

The scope was narrowed further by excluding cases where the regular
armed forces of a third party intervened in significant numbers on the side
of the insurgents. This excluded conflicts such as the Vietnam War, which
blended conventional warfare with counterinsurgency. After narrowing the
scope, the remaining cases were examined to determine which had sufficient data to support analysis. This left 42 cases from the Irregular Warfare
Database for study. Iraq and Afghanistan were examined separately using
other sources in order to include the most recent data available.
The analysis was focused solely on force levels, not the “political,
economic, psychological, and civic actions” cited in the definition. As doctrine indicates, factors such as governance and development are very important. They are not within the scope of the analysis described here, however.
Nor were the strategies and tactics employed by counterinsurgent forces
factored into the analysis. Again, this decision should not be construed to
say that such factors are not important. Clearly they are. Rather, they were
not considered in this analysis for two reasons. First, the purpose of the
analysis was simply to determine how many forces are needed, regardless of how they are employed. Second, because the strategies employed
by counterinsurgent forces have varied widely throughout history and even
within specific conflicts, it is difficult to characterize those strategies in a
consistent manner. Should the Strategic Hamlets program in Vietnam be
considered equivalent to the Briggs Plan in Malaya or earlier British efforts
against the Boers? What about the erection of physical barriers in Baghdad
to quash sectarian conflict? Such questions are important but, again, beyond
the scope of this analysis.
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In accordance with doctrine and previous studies, security forces were
measured per 1,000 residents. Also in keeping with doctrine, security forces
included not only foreign counterinsurgents but also the host nation’s armed
forces, police, and allied militias and paramilitaries. The one exception was
Northern Ireland, where some Unionist groups notionally aligned with the
government but which were proscribed as terrorist organizations were not
counted among the security forces.
Forces were measured by manpower only, not by quality or role.
Clearly, different forces in a given conflict can vary widely in effectiveness
due to variations in their training, motivation, leadership, equipment, level of
corruption, and other factors. When studying a specific conflict in detail, it is
possible to make some qualitative judgments about the relative effectiveness
of the various forces involved. What is much more difficult is comparing
forces across conflicts in a consistent manner. There are ways to examine
the relative effectiveness of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, but it is much less clear how to go about comparing the Afghan National Army of 2009 to British units in Malaya in 1952 or Russian
forces in Chechnya in 2001. Nor is it often possible to break out numbers
according to combat and support roles. Accordingly, this analysis used total
military strength for all cases.
It is possible to distinguish, however, between local and intervening security forces. This distinction was made in the analysis to capture the many
important differences between the two groups. Intervening forces are often
better trained and equipped, but locals typically have the advantage in areas
such as language skills and cultural familiarity. Local forces are defined to
include all soldiers, police, and militias raised from the area affected by the
insurgency. For example, in the Malayan Emergency, soldiers raised from
Malaya were counted as local while British and Commonwealth units were
considered to be intervening forces. Determining which forces can truly be
considered local can be difficult when there are multiple ethnic, linguistic,
or religious groups within a nation. This is particularly true if support for
the insurgency is largely drawn from a particular subnational group. Ethnic
Turkish forces employed by the British in Cyprus were local in the sense
that they lived on the island, but in many ways they were foreign to the
ethnic Greek population from which the insurgents originated. Similarly, in
Afghanistan today it is not clear that many Pashtuns consider ethnic Tajik or
Uzbek soldiers to be much less foreign than American or NATO forces.
The central hypothesis driving this work was the more intense the
insurgency, the more security forces are required to start to reduce the violence level. There are many possible metrics to use to measure the intensity
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of an insurgency. Chief among these measurements are the number of insurgents; insurgent attacks; and civilian, insurgent, or counterinsurgent casualties. Ultimately, the metric chosen for the CAA study was the number of
counterinsurgents (i.e., security forces) killed in action each year per million
residents. This number includes both local and intervening forces. There
were two reasons for choosing this metric. First, it measures the amount of
violent resistance to the security forces’ attempts to control the nation or region. Second, it is more reliably recorded than other possible metrics.
That being said, low levels of violence against security forces do not
necessarily mean counterinsurgents have control of the nation. Insurgents
may avoid armed conflict with the security forces in favor of engaging in
subversion. This can involve co-opting the security forces through intimidation, corruption, and penetration by insurgent sympathizers. It can also include using a mixture of inducements, threats, and violence to gain control
over the population. If the insurgents can threaten and kill civilians with
impunity, the government may come to be seen as ineffective even if security forces are able to operate without being attacked. Low counterinsurgent
casualties could also reflect an unwillingness or inability on the part of security forces to operate in dangerous portions of the nation that are thereby,
in effect, ceded to the insurgents. Due to these dynamics, other metrics tailored to specific conflicts may be better measures of political control. For
example, are government representatives able to sleep in their own villages
without fear? Can the government successfully conscript people into the
security forces, collect taxes, or administer justice? Are key civilians such
as poll workers being killed or intimidated? The problem with all these
measures, valuable though they are, is that there is little, if any, data available that can be used to compare different insurgencies.
Counting the number of insurgents is also problematic at best. Government and insurgent sources often provide different data for political reasons. Even in those cases where the insurgents prevailed and became the ruling
power, they tended not to keep very good records of their own numbers during
the conflict. A neat division between civilians and insurgents is rarely possible.
A common characteristic of insurgents is that they fight only part of the time,
blending back into the civilian population when prudent. Some individuals
may participate only periodically, due to coercion by more committed insurgents or to avenge specific indignities perpetrated by the security forces.
Insurgent and civilian casualties are even less reliable as metrics of
the intensity of the insurgency. The first category reflects government forces’
ability to kill or wound insurgents, not the degree to which the insurgents
oppose the government. Civilian casualties may be caused by any of the ac50
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tors—the insurgents, the government, or others, including criminals and feuding ethnic, religious, or political groups. Moreover, all parties concerned have
strong incentives to misrepresent the statistics. The insurgents will claim that
the government is slaughtering innocent civilians but is incapable of killing
insurgents, and the government will insist the opposite is true.
Finally, for most historical insurgencies, reliable figures do not exist
for the number of insurgent attacks carried out or security forces wounded.
Even where such data exist, they are difficult to interpret. Attacks vary widely in type, size, target, and effectiveness. They can include anything from
nonlethal sabotage of pipelines, to car bombs in packed markets, to pitched
battles with security forces. Similarly, the definition of wounded may include all injuries or only severe wounds, and may include injuries other than
those caused by combat.
In light of these circumstances, the number of counterinsurgents killed
in action (KIA) is assessed as the best available metric of the intensity of insurgent resistance. As with force levels, the KIA rate is divided by population to
allow comparison of insurgencies across nations with widely varying populations. The number is divided by million, instead of thousand, residents because
annual security force KIA numbers are much smaller than total security force
levels. Security force KIA per million population is therefore used as a measure of violence, although it does not include violence against civilians.
Analysis, Results, and Accuracy
The goal of the analysis was to find the number of counterinsurgent
forces required to arrest and begin to reverse a given level of insurgent violence against the security forces. Accordingly, 42 cases were examined to find
instances of turning points, where violence peaked and then decreased. Thirtytwo such peaks were found in the data across 23 of the insurgencies, as some
insurgencies experienced multiple peaks over a period of several years.
As expected, additional forces were indeed needed to reduce higher
levels of violence. This initial relationship was not strong enough, however,
to be particularly useful for planning force requirements, so a number of other
factors were examined as possible drivers. These additional elements included
measures of geography, demographics, insurgent organization and motivation,
economic development, and counterinsurgent rules of engagement. Ultimately,
the only factors that turned out to be significant were the number of personnel
killed and the fraction of security forces drawn from the host nation.
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Violence
Peak Year

Conflict

Security Force
KIA per Million
Population

Security
Forces
per 1,000
Population

Fraction of
Security Forces
Local

Algerian War
(1954-1962)

1958

†

297.5

46.3

0.11

Angola (1961-1974)

1968

20.2

12.3

0.44

Argentina & The Dirty War
(1969-1983)

1976

5.9

6.6

1

Colombian Civil War
(1964-present)

2002

†

28.1

12.2

1

Contras in Nicaragua
(1981-1990)

1987

460.3

22.9

1

Dhofar Rebellion
(1965-1976)

1973

2.4

6.7

0.68

El Salvador (1979-1992)

1983

†

358.6

7.7

1

Greek Civil War (1946-1949)

1948

507.9

29.9

1

Huk Rebellion (1946-1954)

1952

7.8

2.6

1

Indonesia in Timor
(1975-1999)

1978

620.5

33.6

0.33

Kurdish Rebellion vs. Turkey
(1984-1999)

1994

17.7

8.4

1

Malaya (1948-1960)

1951

66.6

12.7

0.76

Mau Mau Revolt (1952-1956)

1954

44.8

9.3

0.87

Mozambique (1964-1974)

1973

†

23.1

5.9

0.54

Nepal People’s War
(1996-2008)

2002

†

26.1

5.3

1

Northern Ireland (1968-1998)

1972

†

109.3

18.4

0.23

Portuguese Guinea (1963-1974)

1967

269.5

38.4

0.15

Rhodesia I (1966-1970)

1968

2.5

3.4

0.88

17.5

7.7

1

Shining Path in Peru (1980-1999)

1992

†

Tamil Insurgency (1983-2002)

2000

48.3

8.8

1

Tunisian Independence War
(1952-1956)

1954

7.6

14.1

0.12

Tupamaro Insurgency in Uruguay
(1963-1973)

1972

7.1

4.3

1

† Representative year; multiple violence peaks occurred.

Figure 1. Violence Peaks in Counterinsurgencies
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This data was used to determine the following force threshold equation:
F = 1.2 x (K/L)0.45 + 2.8
where:
F = security forces required per 1,000 population to reduce violence
K = number of security forces killed annually, per million population
L = fraction of security forces local to the conflict area

In words, this formula reveals that the minimum counterinsurgent force is 2.8
soldiers per 1,000 residents, with more forces required as the violence level
increases. Additionally, the larger the proportion of security forces drawn
from the local population, the fewer personnel will be needed to deal with the
violence. The implications of this equation are discussed later in this article,
but before turning to the implications a discussion of the accuracy of the equation is in order.
If the threshold equation is correct, three things should be observed.
First, in conflicts where the counterinsurgent effort achieved and maintained
a force equal to or greater than the threshold, the violence level should drop
to and stay at a relatively low level. Second, if the counterinsurgent side
never achieves the force threshold, the violence should increase until the
insurgents win a military victory. Third, if the counterinsurgent forces are
entirely comprised of persons from outside the host nation—mathematically, if L is zero—the counterinsurgents should fail. Seventeen of 19 cases
tested against these criteria turned out as expected, for an accuracy of 89
percent. The affirmed cases were two conflicts with zero or near-zero levels
of local forces (the First Chechen War and the British in Palestine), 14 conflicts where the counterinsurgents had more than the threshold force, and
three conflicts where the counterinsurgents never had enough forces once
the insurgency began. The two cases that did not match expectations were
the Chadian Civil War of 1965-69 and Venezuela in 1960-63. In both these
conflicts, the violence level dropped even though security forces did not
meet the calculated force requirements.
Another way to test the threshold equation is to look at yearly data.
Given force level and KIA data for one year in a conflict, the equation can be
used to forecast whether the violence level will increase or decrease during
the next year, and the forecast can be checked against the historical record.
Here the equation performs less well, with an overall accuracy of 63 percent. This accuracy increases as the violence level increases, to 67 percent
at per-capita KIA rates similar to those of Afghanistan in 2009 and to more
than 75 percent for conflicts as violent as the Second Chechen War or the
Soviet experience in Afghanistan. The annual forecasts are less accurate
than those for conflicts overall for several reasons. First, the analysis canWinter 2009-10
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not predict decisions by either side in the conflict to escalate or de-escalate
the conflict in a particular year. Second, the historical data is often limited
and approximate, and presumably not 100 percent correct. Both of these
reasons have a greater effect on accuracy at relatively low violence levels,
because small absolute fluctuations have a greater proportional effect in
low violence arenas. Nor is it surprising that accuracy in forecasting force
requirements should increase as violence increases; it seems probable that
the more violent the insurgency, the more security requirements come to
dominate the other aspects of counterinsurgency.
The threshold equation also works well for Iraq. Using annual popu6
lation, force level, and KIA data,7 the formula shows that combined Iraqi
and Coalition units met the force threshold and violence began to decrease
in 2006, though US and civilian casualties did not peak until 2007. In contrast, violence in Afghanistan has not yet peaked. Based on seasonal trends
and the data available, it is reasonable to expect approximately 2,000 security force KIA in 2009 (or 69 KIA per million residents). Using a mid-year
population of 28.9 million8 and current security forces9 (of which 65 percent
are Afghan),10 the analysis suggests that a ratio of 11 security forces per
1,000 residents would be required to arrest the current violence, compared
to the current ratio of about 9 per 1,000. These are approximate numbers
using open-source data, and they do not address the constraints on raising additional forces quickly. Still, they give some idea of how the current
strength of security forces compares to the requirements suggested by history. Figure 2 puts the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan into historical context in terms of violence and calculated force requirements.
Forces per 1,000 Population
Required to Reduce Violence
Year

KIA per Million
Population

100%
Local

65%
Local
Forces

10% Local
Forces

Colombian Civil War

2002

28

8

9

18

Afghanistan

2008

50

10

11

22

Malayan Emergency
Iraq
Algerian War

1951
2006
1958

67
120
298

11
13
18

12
15
21

25
31
45

Contras in Nicaragua

1987

460

21

25

55

Conflict

Figure 2. Comparison of Force Requirements
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Implications for Policy
The results of the CAA study have several implications for policymakers. First, as noted in previous studies, security forces should be proportional to the population, and in nations with tens of millions of residents the
force requirement may outstrip available resources. Second, the more intense
the insurgency, the more personnel will be required to reduce the violence
level. Since insurgent violence historically tends to increase over time unless it is checked, the longer it is allowed to worsen the more forces will be
required to turn the situation around. If the violence increases for too long, it
may spiral out of control.
Third, in counterinsurgency, the higher the proportion of local security forces the better. This may seem counterintuitive, since local forces may
not be trained, led, or equipped to western standards. Local forces possess
distinct advantages, however, in terms of native familiarity and increased
commitment. They understand the human terrain that is so critical in counterinsurgency, speak the area’s languages, and understand the culture. If
they are operating in their home area, they can draw upon a lifetime’s experience and on personal connections cultivated over many years. This intense
familiarity is likely to extend to a better understanding of the physical geography as well. In contrast, foreign soldiers may be resented as occupiers and
infidels, and may, through ignorance or arrogance, commit blunders that
alienate them from the population.
Local forces have other advantages when it comes to persistence and
motivation. In contrast to foreign units, they do not rotate out of the conflict
theater. Their understanding of the complex and ever-changing dynamics
of the situation is not interrupted by redeployment. Local forces may also
be more personally committed to the fight, because they know that if the
insurgents win, their own lives and those of their families are at risk. Also,
the presence of substantial local security forces may not only be a driver, but
also a result of success, because such forces imply that there is a functioning
government that is capable of convincing its people to side with the counterinsurgents. As the threshold equation suggests, if the counterinsurgents
cannot convince any locals to join their forces, their cause is probably lost.11
Moreover, the insurgents and government compete for support from the same
pool of recruits. The more civilians who can be recruited into the security
forces, the fewer who are available for recruitment by the insurgents.
Fourth, even when there is no violence against counterinsurgent forces, the constant term in the equation, 2.8 soldiers per 1,000 residents, suggests
that a portion of security forces are needed for police duties. This number is
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somewhat lower than McGrath’s figure of 4.1 police per 1,000 residents,
but his conclusions were drawn based on circumstances in five US cities.
The calculation for the United States as a whole is lower, around 3.3 police per 1,000 residents. Around the world, police-to-population ratios vary
from near zero to more than 10 per 1,000 residents, with an average between three and four.12 The determinants of police force size are many, with
police-to-population ratios generally higher as wealth, population density,
and political repression increase. Statistics on police strength do not always
include administrative or other support personnel. In some nations they may
include paramilitary or gendarmerie units not counted in other nations. Nor
is the western model of policing the only one. In many societies, disputes
may be resolved by informal methods, and order is enforced by people who
wear no uniforms and draw no salary. Thus, this analysis should not be
taken to mean that all countries require 2.8 uniformed police per 1,000 residents. Rather, it simply suggests that this number is approximately the average requirement for peacetime security forces in the cases studied.
Cautions and Conclusions
It is hoped that this analysis will provide useful insight for future efforts to determine force requirements. It is not, however, an easy solution to
a tremendously difficult problem. War cannot be solved through equations.
All that analysis can hope to do is provide useful insight and advice to leaders who are grappling with the complexity of real-world decisions. This
analysis is descriptive, not prescriptive. It looks at what happened historically and attempts to explain trends. Any attempt to use such an analysis to
drive policy should be conducted with great caution.
This article examines the military and security forces needed to reverse increasing insurgent violence. Having enough forces to reach such a
turning point does not, however, equate to victory, or even the attainment of
low levels of violence. Once insurgent momentum is reversed, the security
forces have to remain for years until the violence eventually drops to low
levels. Even then, political success can be elusive.
Another caveat of the work is that the analysis cannot predict the violence level before a conflict starts. Many insurgencies simmer at a low level
for years before becoming serious enough to provoke a significant reaction
from the government. In contrast, the Soviet Union faced intense resistance
immediately upon invading Afghanistan, with more than 4,000 Soviet and
Afghan soldiers killed every year of the conflict (or more than 250 fatalities
per million Afghan residents). Policy-makers contemplating intervening in
other nations should remember that not only can invasions lead to insurgen56
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cies; they also can lead almost immediately to levels of violence more than
three times that currently seen in Afghanistan after eight years of war.
The analysis is built on annual data and its forecasts are on an annual
basis, but a year is a long time in a war, and even longer in domestic politics.
Even several years into an insurgency, the analysis is less than 70 percent
accurate in forecasting whether violence will increase or decrease in a given
period. Further refinements to the analysis may improve this accuracy rate,
but it will never reach 100 percent. Even if it could, military efforts alone
cannot ensure victory in counterinsurgency. At best, having adequate forces
can enable the counterinsurgent side to provide a certain level of security,
and security itself is a necessary but not sufficient condition for victory.
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